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Time consistency problems can arise when environmental taxes are employed
to encourage ﬁrms to take irreversible abatement decisions. Setting a high car-
bon tax, for instance, would induce ﬁrms to invest in low-carbon technology,
yet once investment has occurred the government can then reduce the carbon
tax to better achieve other objectives: lower energy prices, redistribution, and
electoral success. The resulting time inconsistency discourages ﬁrms from in-
vesting in the ﬁrst place. We propose an institutional solution to this problem,
adapted from the monetary policy literature: the commitment outcome can
be achieved through delegation to an ‘environmental policymaker’, akin to a
conservative central banker.
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When regulation is designed to induce ﬁrms to take irreversible actions, problems of time
inconsistency are often not far away. For instance, reducing carbon emissions is likely
to require signiﬁcant irreversible investment from the private sector. To encourage ﬁrms
to invest in low-emissions technology, governments around the world are beginning to
price emissions using a tax or a permits system. If ﬁrms believe that a carbon price is
not a temporary measure, irreversible investment in low-emissions technology may appear
proﬁtable. However, once investment costs are sunk and emissions decline, the government
can reduce the emissions price to achieve other objectives, including lower energy prices,
redistribution, enhanced ‘international competitiveness’, and political aims.1 Knowing
this, ﬁrms are reluctant to invest in the ﬁrst place.
There many examples of such time-inconsistency problems in environmental policy. Gers-
bach and Glazer (1999) cite several. Such problems are pressing today.2 Surprisingly,
however, the problem of time-inconsistency in environmental policy has not received a
great deal of attention in the literature. Several recent papers propose models where the
time-inconsistency arises from distributional objectives. For instance, in the two-period
model of Abrego and Perroni (2002), the policymaker employs an emission tax in order to
encourage investment in a clean production process. However, once investment has taken
place, it is optimal for the policymaker to lower the tax in order to minimise unwanted
distributional impacts. Realising this, private agents conclude that the promise of high
future emission taxes is not credible.
The time-inconsistency problem examined in the two-period model of Marsiliani and Ren-
str¨ om (2000) also results from a dynamic trade-oﬀ between environmental and redistribu-
tive goals. In the ﬁrst period, the government employs an energy tax to encourage (ir-
reversible) investment in energy eﬃcient durables. In the second period, however, the
government uses the energy tax to redistribute revenue from richer (higher productivity)
individuals to poorer (lower productivity) individuals.3 Hence, unlike Abrego and Perroni
(2002), here the government has an incentive to deviate towards a higher — not a lower
— energy tax in the second period for redistribution purposes: once investment has taken
place the elasticity of the tax base is lower.
Distributional concerns, however, are not a necessary condition for dynamic consistency
problems. Gersbach and Glazer (1999) propose a hold-up model where ﬁrms in the ﬁrst
period choose whether to invest in a lumpy technology. This technology permits emission
reductions in the second period. After observing ﬁrm investment levels, the government
1With a full set of policy instruments and taxes, these other objectives can be achieved with other
instruments, avoiding time inconsistency. However, governments rarely avail themselves of the optimal
combination of instruments given their mix of objectives.
2For instance, in 2003 the UK government consulted upon changes to the rules on the eligibility of
co-ﬁring for Renewable Obligation Certiﬁcates (ROCs), as outlined in DTI (2003). Such changes would
cut the price of ROCs and reduce the proﬁtability of investment in renewable energy.
3Note that energy taxes are typically viewed as being highly regressive. Nevertheless, Poterba argues
that such taxes are less regressive when measured over the lifetime rather than in terms of annual income:
Poterba (1989) and Poterba (1991).
2determines the total number of emission permits available and allocates them equally to
each ﬁrm. In the second period, ﬁrms choose their optimum emission reductions and trade
emissions permits. Gersbach and Glazer (1999) show that with permits, subgame perfect
equilibria exist where ﬁrms make the lumpy investment. In comparison with emission
taxes, emission permits are said to better solve the hold-up problem by providing an
incentive for ﬁrms to invest.4
In contrast, Biglaiser et al. (1995) propose that emission taxes are preferable to emission
permits for they avoid time-inconsistency problems. They show that, as ﬁrms respond
to pollution regulation by investing to reduce the cost of pollution control, the optimum
number of pollution permits falls. Firms, recognising this eﬀect, behave strategically and
reduce the level of investment relative to the ﬁrst best.5 In contrast, the optimum emission
tax is equal to the marginal social damage, which is typically independent of pollution
control costs. Hence Biglaiser et al. (1995) conclude that while emission permits are
time-inconsistent, emission taxes are not.
All these models share the feature that the regulator has only a single instrument to achieve
two competing goals, and where private expectations about the use of the instrument are
important. Typically, the regulator wants to convince ﬁrms that it will use the instrument
to achieve one goal (e.g. compliance with emission standards), but ex post has an incentive
to use it to achieve the other (eg, higher output). The time-inconsistency posed by the
introduction of a carbon tax is also of this variety. In other words, policymakers want to
persuade ﬁrms that carbon taxes will be high enough to render (irreversible) investment
in new infrastructure proﬁtable. However, once such investment is made the government
has an incentive to reduce the level of the carbon tax, supporting its domestic export
industries and free-riding on other countries’ eﬀorts to control climate change.
This type of dynamic inconsistency has been examined in great detail in the monetary
policy literature. There, as is well known, the policymaker wants to convince ﬁrms that
it will use interest rates to achieve low inﬂation, but ex post it has an incentive to employ
rates to inﬂuence output. Since the seminal papers of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
Barro and Gordon (1983), eﬀorts have been made to ﬁnd solutions to the dynamic consis-
tency problem and the resulting ‘inﬂation bias’. Rogoﬀ (1985) showed that delegation of
monetary policy to a ‘conservative’ central banker lead to a Pareto improvement in terms
of ﬂexibility of policy and a reduction in the inﬂation bias. Evidence since has appeared
to support his prediction that greater central bank independence is associated with lower
inﬂation.6
More recently, Walsh (1995) demonstrated that, in theory at least, the resolution of this
4This claim, however, is not entirely fair, as it is based upon a comparison between a system of revenue-
neutral emission permits with revenue-raising taxes. As such, the permit system provides a greater ﬁnancial
incentives for investment than the tax system. The permit system should be compared with a revenue-
neutral tax equivalent.
5This is the same concept as the ‘ratchet eﬀect’ in microeconomic theory. Such a ratchet eﬀect could
be applicable to our model when viewed on a broader scale — for instance, British ﬁrms might anticipate
that if Britain outperforms its emission target, it is likely to have more stringent targets imposed at the
next round of international negotiations.
6See, eg, Alesina and Summers (1993).
3credibility-ﬂexibility trade-oﬀ is remarkably simple. An optimal contract exists between
the government (principal) and the central banker (agent). The contract merely imposes
a tax on the bank for inﬂation levels in excess of the inﬂation target. Moreover, Svensson
(1997) then showed that a suitably speciﬁed inﬂation target, at a level below the socially
optimal inﬂation rate, can produce an equivalent result.
In this paper, we draw upon the monetary policy literature to propose a novel solution
to the time-inconsistency problem of environmental policy. Unlike Abrego and Perroni
(2002), who show that the eﬀects of dynamic inconsistency can be mitigated by employ-
ing investment subsidies in conjunction with emission taxes, or Marsiliani and Renstr¨ om
(2000), who argue that that tax hypothecation provides a partial remedy, we propose
an institutional solution. We show that environmental policy credibility can be obtained
by delegating responsibility for achieving emission targets to an independent authority.
Three forms of delegation are considered. First, if the authority is able to establish and
maintain a good reputation, it can be delegated the true social welfare function. Second,
as with the Bank of England, this authority could be granted control of a single instru-
ment, the carbon tax, in order to achieve compliance with a paramount goal, a carbon
emissions target. Third, discretion might be granted to an authority constituted by an
‘environmentalist policymaker’ akin to a conservative central banker.
In section 2 of the paper, we present a model which sets up the credibility problem and
illustrates that the delegation of responsibility for achieving emission targets to an indepen-
dent body, coupled with an optimal contract, can solves the time-inconsistency problem.
In section 3, we consider the impact of providing the government with an additional in-
strument; an output tax or subsidy. In section 4, we consider some of features of the new
institution that would be required to ensure that it does not merely relocate rather than
resolve the problem, as asserted by McCallum (1995). Section 5 concludes.
2 A model of time-inconsistent carbon taxation
We develop a stylised, deterministic model of government and ﬁrm interaction when pro-
duction of a good (eg energy) produces carbon dioxide emissions. The model is solved
for two cases: ﬁrst, when the government commits to an announced carbon taxation rate;
and second, when the government retains the discretion to alter the tax rate. While the
model is discussed with reference to the energy sector, it is applicable more generally to
any situation in which irreversible investment by the private sector generates diﬀerent ex
ante and ex post incentives for the government.
2.1 Firm behaviour
Suppose that energy demand exhibits constant elasticity and is given by:




































































Figure 1: Technology possibility set.
where P is an energy price index, ² > 0 is the price elasticity of demand and ® > 0 is a
constant. Production of energy produces emissions E according to a linear function:
E = eQ (2)
where e 2 (0;eD] is a dirtiness parameter of the generating technology and eD is the emis-
sions per unit output of the dirtiest technology, which has the lowest cost of production,
cD. Emissions per unit output can be reduced by increasing production costs, c, where
the set of possible (e;c) combinations is given by:
e ¸ ¯c¡¾ (3)
where ¾ is an elasticity parameter and ¯ = eDc¾
D. Assuming ﬁrms maximise proﬁts,
equation (3) binds. This technology frontier is shown in Figure 1. Firm production costs
are represented by the single parameter, c, so that total costs in the industry are cQ. As
such, c represents an aggregation of (fairly small) marginal costs and (fairly large) ﬁxed
costs, but in the model below the distinction between marginal and ﬁxed costs is not
important.
For the moment, we assume that the government has a single policy instrument — a
carbon tax, t — to inﬂuence ﬁrm technology choices.7 Taking account of the tax, when
ﬁrms are identical, total average costs are c + te.
A simple yet relatively realistic assumption is that ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition
with free entry. Under such circumstances, entry will occur until zero proﬁts are reached,
implying price equals average cost.8 Given such a market structure, ﬁrms choose their
operation point within the technology possibility set in order to minimise expected costs,
c+E[t]e, subject to equation (3). Optimal cost and cleanliness choices for a given carbon
7In section 3 we consider the addition of an output instrument.
8See, for example, Varian (1992), p. 220. We abstract from ﬁrm integer issues which imply that

























































































































































Figure 2: Relationship between relative prices and relative emissions.















For a particular technology choice of cost and dirtiness (¯ c; ¯ e), the relationship between
prices and emissions can be parameterized by the tax rate, t. From equations (1) and (2):
E(t) = ¯ edP(t)¡² (6)
It follows that dE=dP < 0 and d2E=dP2 > 0, so the relationship between prices and
emissions for ﬁxed technology is strictly downwards sloping and convex. Figure 2 illustrates
the relationship between prices and emissions relative to a baseline with no carbon tax
and the dirtiest technology in which P = PD ´ cD, and E = ED ´ eD®c¡²
D . The curves
AA0 to DD0 each represent a particular ﬁxed technology (¯ c; ¯ e), where AA0 reﬂects the
most polluting technology and BB0 to DD0 reﬂect successively cleaner technologies. For
a given technology, increasing the carbon tax will increase prices and reduce emissions,
corresponding to a movement north-west along one such curve. Point A therefore marks
the baseline with no carbon tax and dirtiest technology, where P = PD and E = ED.
When ﬁrm technology choice is not ﬁxed, but responds endogenously to the tax rate, an
increase in t will induce ﬁrms to switch to cleaner technology. Hence, with endogenous
technology, emissions are more responsive to changes in the tax rate. The relationship
between emissions and prices is now given by:
E(t) = e(t)dP(t)¡² (7)
where e(t) is given by equation (5). Assuming expectations are fulﬁlled such that E[t] = t,
substituting equation (5) to equation (7) deﬁnes the curve labelled AE in Figure 2. AE
6is coincident with the AA0 until the tax rate is high enough to induce e < eD. From
this point leftwards, AE is shallower than the ﬁxed technology curves: with endogenous
technology, carbon tax increases are more eﬀective at reducing emissions.
2.2 Welfare
The welfare function in our partial equilibrium framework comprises three elements:
change in consumer surplus s(P); tax revenues r = tE; and disutility from pollution
z(E).9 Hence:
W = s(P) + ºr ¡ ¸z(E) (8)
where ¸ is the weight on the pollution term and º is the marginal beneﬁt of public funds
from the emission tax, each relative to consumer surplus. For an isoelastic demand curve,








A simple speciﬁcation of the disutility of emissions is:
z(E) = E° (10)
where ° > 0. Note that ° > 1 implies increasing marginal damage of pollution. Combining







+ ºtE(t) ¡ ¸E(t)° (11)
2.3 Solution under commitment
When the government can commit in advance to the carbon tax rate, the situation can be
modelled as a simple dynamic game of complete information. The moves of the game are:
(1) the government announces and commits to a carbon tax rate t; and (2) the private
sector forms expectations of the tax rate, with E[t] = t under commitment, and hence
makes its technology choice (c, e).
The game is solved by backward induction. For a given carbon tax, the private sector
cost and emissions choices are simply c(t) and e(t) in equations (4) and (5). The private
section reaction function is simply the endogenous technology curve in Figure 2. Taking
this reaction function into account, the policymaker sets the carbon tax to maximise the




















9This welfare function is consistent with Target 4 of the DTI Public Service Agreement 2003-2006 to
‘[e]nsure that the UK ranks in the top 3 most competitive energy markets in the EU and G7 in each year
[and] to help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 12.5% from 1990 levels’: see HM Treasury (2002).
7Solution of (12) yields an optimal tax rate, t¤, from which ﬁrm technology choices are
given by substitution to equations (4) and (5). In graphical terms, the optimal tax for the
government is merely the point on the ﬁrm reaction function in Figure 3 which maximises
its welfare function. This occurs at a point of tangency with a welfare contour (marked by
a diamond on Figure 3). At an interior solution — one where the tax rate is non-zero and
some abatement occurs — the welfare function is concave and the ﬁrm reaction function
is convex. This ensures uniqueness of optimal tax rate.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique interior commitment solution, (t¤;c¤;e¤).
Proof 1 See Appendix.
The importance of commitment is clear from Figure 3. Once the tax has been announced
and ﬁrms have invested in cleaner technology resulting in the solution marked by the
diamond on Figure 3, if º < 1 the government has an ex post incentive to lower the
tax rate, moving down the ﬁxed technology curve and lowering prices, improving welfare.
This ex post incentive gives rise to the time-inconsistency problem, rendering commitment
valuable.
2.4 Solution under discretion
When the government retains the discretion to adjust the tax rate ex post, another dynamic
game of complete information is appropriate. In this case, however, the private sector move
ﬁrst. The move order is: (1) the private sector forms their expectation of the tax rate
E[t] and thus chooses their optimal (c, e); and (2) the government chooses the tax rate, t,
given the ﬁrms’ technology choice.
Solving by backwards induction, the government reaction function, t(c), is given by the







In other words, the policymaker chooses the carbon tax which, for a ﬁxed technology curve
such as AA0, will maximise its welfare function. The resulting reaction function is the locus
of tangency between the welfare contours and the ﬁxed technology lines. The equilibrium
tax rate, ˆ t, in which the ﬁrms’ expectations are fulﬁlled, yields a solution marked by the
circle in Figure 3.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique interior discretion solution, (ˆ t;ˆ c; ˆ e).
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Figure 3: Discretion and commitment solutions for º = 0:8
2.5 Comparison of results
At interior solutions, de=dt and dc=dt are non-zero and thus the solution of equation (12)
is, in general, diﬀerent from the solution to (13). The diﬀerence between the discretion and
commitment outcomes arises because the marginal eﬀect of the tax is diﬀerent before and
after technology choice. After technology choices have been made, damage from emissions
is less responsive to the tax rate, such that @z=@t < dz=dt. This implies that ceteris
paribus the optimal tax ex post will be lower than that ex ante. In contrast, tax revenues
are more responsive than they were before investment, such that @r=@t > dr=dt. This
eﬀect works in the opposite direction: other things being equal a higher tax is optimal ex
post. The responsiveness of consumer surplus to the tax rate before and after investment
is obviously unchanged.10
The existence and direction of the time inconsistency problem depends upon which of these
two eﬀects — the increased elasticity of tax revenues or the reduced elasticity of emissions
— dominates. If it is the former (latter), the tax is higher (lower) under discretion than
under commitment. In Proposion 3, we demonstrate that this depends upon the value of
º. This result is illustrated in Figure 4.
Proposition 3 For an interior solution, when º < 1 the tax rate is higher under com-
10This is an application of the envelope theorem: when ﬁrms are minimising prices, it follows that
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Figure 4: Discretion and commitment emission taxes for various º
mitment than under discretion (t¤ > ˆ t). When º = 1, the discretion and commitment
solutions are identical and Pigouvian. When º > 1, taxes are lower under commitment.
Proof 3 See Appendix.
Proposion 3 accords with conventional Pigouvian logic: for º = 1, the optimal tax is the
marginal damage from emissions, ˆ t = t¤ = ¸°E°¡1. There is no divergence between the
commitment and discretionary solutions.
In the classical analysis developed by Pigou (1947), Harberger (1964), Browning (1976)
and Browning (1987), the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) is greater than one when-
ever there are distortions in the revenue raising process, which in practical terms is al-
most inevitable.11 However, Atkinson and Stern (1974) and Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971)
demonstrate that it is possible for the MCF to be less than one when the additional rev-
enue is obtained in a way that reduces the distortionary eﬀects of pre-existing taxes. For
instance, in a model with pollution Ballard and Medema (1993) ﬁnd that a Pigouvian
externality-correcting tax has an MCF of 0.73. While the appropriate MCF for an energy
tax is a moot point, it is probably likely to be slightly above one. This would suggest that
environmentalists need not be concerned that governments will renege on promised rates
of carbon taxes.
Nevertheless, in practice, the direction of the time inconsistency problem will be aﬀected
by other considerations which are not explicitly accounted for in our model. In particular,
as noted above, distributional concerns are relevant as energy taxes are typically viewed
11See the review in Ballard and Fullerton (1992).
10as being highly regressive. Including distributional concerns in the welfare function may
increase the incentive to reduce the tax ex post. Similarly, including political economy
considerations, such as an electoral need for the government to be supported from by
fossil fuel and manufacturing lobby groups would further increase the incentive to reduce
the tax ex post. These considerations suggest that government may in practice behave
as if º < 1 — revenue from environmental taxation brings concomitant political economy
drawbacks such that the eﬀective marginal beneﬁt of environmental taxation is less than
one.
If so, a government promise to implement the eﬃcient carbon tax is not credible. Knowing
this, investment by ﬁrms in low-carbon technology will be sub-optimal. There are several
potential ways to try to circumvent the time-inconsistency problem. We consider ﬁrst the
additional of a further instrument — an output subsidy — and then the delegation of
taxation policy to an independent energy agency.
3 Results with an additional instrument
Suppose the government can employ an additional instrument in the form of an output
subsidy payment, s, based on the amount of energy produced. With s < 0, the instrument
operates as an output tax. Given the assumed market structure, the output subsidy will
lower prices and increase industry output with entry. It does not alter each individual
ﬁrm’s tradeoﬀ between cost and emissions. Hence the impact is that equilibrium price is
now given by:
P(t;s) = c + te ¡ s (14)








+ º(te ¡ s)Q ¡ ¸E° (15)
Consider the discretion case with the move order as described in section 2.4 above, and
where the government sets the capacity payment simultaneously with the emissions tax. Ex
ante, unlike the emissions tax, the capacity payment has no eﬀect on technology choice.
However, once ﬁrms have made their technology choice, the capacity payment and the
emissions tax are equivalent instruments: neither aﬀects technology, and both aﬀect con-
sumer surplus and emissions through their impact on price. The marginal eﬀect of the
output subsidy is therefore the same ex post and ex ante. From equations (14) and (15)












Under discretion, then, the output instrument is not orthogonal to the subsidy, and its
addition does not resolve the time inconsistency problem; with t = ˆ t, there is no role
for the subsidy and s = 0 is optimal. Indeed, rather than solving the time inconsistency
problem, the extra instrument might accentuate it. If ﬁrms believe that the government
might employ an output tax rather than the emissions tax ex post, the incentive to switch
to cleaner technology is blunted and emissions will increase.
11Under commitment, however, things are diﬀerent. With º < 1, it is optimal to set the tax
at a modiﬁed Pigouvian level, and provide output subsidy s > 0 to reduce the equilibrium
price of the good. For instance, with ° = 1, the marginal damage of emissions is ¸ and the







Thus for º < 1, the tax is set above the marginal damage of emissions to induce a switch
to cleaner technology, with a strictly positive subsidy to oﬀset the price increase.12 When
º = 1, there is no role for the subsidy, as the Pigouvian tax rate achieves both emissions
reduction and optimal revenue raising objectives. Finally, for º > 1, the tax is set at less
than the marginal damage, and as s < 0 the extra instrument is employed as an output
tax. In contrast to the emissions tax, the output tax raises additional revenue without
inducing technology that is too clean and too expensive.
Hence, under commitment, the additional output instrument is welfare improving because
it eliminates the tradeoﬀ between internalising the pollution externality and achieving the
optimal tax mix. However, under discretion, the extra instrument does not help, and might
be problematic. In other words, the problems that result from the inability of government
to commit to environmental policy do not appear to be resolved by the addition of more
instruments. A diﬀerent solution is required.
4 Delegation to an Energy Agency
Section 2 demonstrated the costs of time-inconsistency and the advantages of the ability to
commit to a speciﬁed carbon tax. Section 3 demonstrated that the addition of an output
instrument will not generally resolve the problem created by government discretion. In this
section, we consider the features of several institutional solutions to the time-inconsistency
problem.
The ﬁrst, and obvious, possibility is the delegation of the power to set carbon policy to
an independent energy agency, much like the delegation of monetary policy to the Bank
of England.13 Various forms of delegation are possible.
² The agency could be asked to maximise the social welfare function, provided that it
is able to develop and retain a good reputation.
² The agency could be given a single objective (the optimal level of emissions) to
achieve, twinned with an appropriate policy instrument (the carbon tax rate, the
number of emissions permits, or a hybrid instrument).
² The agency could be constituted by people who place a diﬀerent weight on emissions
than the government. For instance, º < 1 appointing an ‘environmentalist policy-
maker’ could achieve the standard commitment outcome, much like the appointment
of a conservative central banker in a monetary policy setting.
12In the limit as º ! 0 and revenue requirements do not matter, the ﬁrst best is achieved by a tax and
subsidy approaching inﬁnity.
13See Helm et al. (2003) for the various arguments in favour of delegation, and Helm (2003) on wider
energy issues.
12We consider each of the options in turn.
4.1 Delegation of the social welfare function
If the agency is able to develop and retain a reputation for fulﬁlling its promises, it could
be delegated the social welfare function. If the agency is a long-lived institution removed
from short term political pressures, concern for its reputation would provide it with an
incentive to implement the commitment outcome, despite short term gains from reneging.
This is addressed by Barro and Gordon (1983) for monetary policy.
4.2 Delegation of a single objective
Under this approach, the agency would have a mandate to use its economic instrument
(setting a carbon tax or a number of carbon emission permits) to achieve a single objective.
In other words, the function maximised by the energy agency would be simply:
WA = (E ¡ ¯ E)2 (17)
where ¯ E > 0 is an emissions target ﬁxed (in advance) by the government.14
With such a function, the agency does not face trade-oﬀ between emissions and price ob-
jectives, unlike the government, and hence the problem of time inconsistency is eliminated.
The energy agency simply sets the tax to achieve E = ¯ E. Indeed, time inconsistency prob-
lems of this type can only arise when one instrument is employed to achieve two objectives.
When one objective is removed from the welfare function, the dynamic inconsistency dis-
appears, as does the distinction between commitment and discretion.
The interesting question concerns the setting of ¯ E. For a government unconstrained by
an international regime, it is evident that ¯ E should be set taking into account the private
sector reaction function. It is immediately clear that the optimal level of ¯ E is that obtained
in the commitment solution to the model in section 2.
4.3 Delegation to an ‘environmentalist policymaker’
A third possibility is to delegate carbon tax policy to an agency with preferences that
diﬀer from those of society. The distortion resulting from the divergence between agency
and social preferences may be tuned to oﬀset the distortion from the inability to commit.
If the time inconsistency problem arises because the eﬀective º < 1, one would delegate
to an agency with a higher ¸, denoted ¸P. Figure 5 superimposes isowelfare curves for
14This welfare function would also be applicable in the case of a binding international regime on carbon
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Figure 5: Commitment optimum achieved by the environmentalist policymaker
the ’environmentalist’ policymaker upon the standard isowelfare curves from Figure 3
drawn as dashed grey ellipses. The bliss point for an environmentalist policymaker is at
a higher relative price and lower relative emissions. Figure 5 further illustrates that the
commitment outcome may be obtained by choosing a ¸P such that the ‘discretion’ outcome
(which we refer to as delegation) for the environmentalist policymaker is the commitment
solution with standard preferences. As earlier, this solution is marked by the diamond.15
Proposition 4 If commitment is not feasible, delegation to a policymaker with a diﬀerent
weight on emissions, ¸P 6= ¸, can achieve the commitment solution.
Proof 4 See Appendix.
5 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that a time-inconsistency problem is likely to arise in carbon
policy. Firms are being encouraged to make irreversible investments in a context where
governments have dual objectives to reduce emissions and keep energy prices low. The
15Of course, if º > 1, the appropriate agency would be one governed by an ‘industrialist policymaker’
who placed less weight on emissions than society at large, such that ¸
P < ¸.
14time-inconsistency problem arises when the optimal government policy ex ante investment
in low-carbon technology is diﬀerent to that ex post.
We demonstrate that the addition of an output subsidy does not resolve the problem.
Instead, we put forward an institutional solution to the problem. We argue that delegating
the control over energy prices and environmental objectives to an independent, long-lived,
energy agency can resolve the time-inconsistency problem.
If the energy agency is able to develop and maintain a reputation for fulﬁlling its promises,
it could be delegated the social welfare function and the concomitant authority to announce
and commit to an appropriate tradeoﬀ between emissions and prices. If the establishment
of a credible reputation is likely to be diﬃcult, the agency could either be delegated a
single objective, or an ’environmentalist’ policymaker could be appointed, in a manner
analogous with the literature on the conservative central banker.
However, energy policy is complicated by the presence of additional market failures, not
least of which is security of supply. Eﬀorts to correct these additional market failures may
be stymied by further time inconsistency problems. Whether a long-lived and reputable
energy agency may be able to achieve the commitment solution in the presence of multiple
market failures is a question for further research.
15Appendix
We prove Proposition 3 before proceeding to prove propositions 2, 1 and 4.
Proof of Proposition 3
We seek to prove that for º = 1 there is no time-consistency, while for º < 1 there is an
ex post incentive to lower the emission tax and for º > 1 there is an ex post incentive to
raise taxes. It is instructive to examine the eﬀect of the tax on the three components of
welfare.
Consumer Surplus. Under discretion, hence assuming technology (c;e) is ﬁxed, the




In the commitment solution when technology responds to the emissions tax, the impact




















In other words, the marginal impact of the emissions tax on consumer surplus is identical
in the discretion and the commitment solutions.
















Noting that de=dt < 0, it is clear that tax revenue is less responsive to changes in the
emissions tax rate under commitment.


















= ¡e®P¡² + ºe®P¡² £
1 ¡ te²P¡1¤
+ ¸²°e°+1®°P¡²°¡1 (25)
= (º ¡ 1)e®P¡² ¡ º®e2t²P¡²¡1 + ¸²°e°+1®°P¡²°¡1 (26)











In other words, the impact of the emissions tax under commitment is as for discretion,
except that the tax has a smaller eﬀect on tax revenues, and a larger eﬀect on pollution.
However, comparing equations (26) and (27), it can be seen that the additional eﬀects of





































Now if º = 1, because de=dt < 0 it follows that dW=dt = 0 , @W=@t = 0. In other
words, when º = 1 the rules and discretion solutions are identical and there is no time
inconsistency. In contrast, if º 6= 1 and if de=dt 6= 0 (which is satisﬁed if e 6= eD), then
time-inconsistency arises. With the tax rate set at the discretionary optima, such that
@W=@t = 0, then if º < 1 it follows that dW=dt > 0, and the taxation rate under discretion
will be lower than under commitment as there is an ex post incentive to lower tax rates.
In contrast, when º > 1 the tax rate under discretion will be higher than under rules; the
ex post incentive is to increase tax rates.




= ¡®e2t²P¡²¡1 + ¸²°e°+1®°P¡²°¡1 = 0 (30)
Simpliﬁcation, and substitution for E = e®P¡² yields:
t = ¸°E°¡1 (31)
which is simply the marginal damage from emissions.
17Proof of Proposition 2
We prove here that there exists a unique interior discretion solution to equation (13) which
we denote (ˆ t;ˆ c; ˆ e). We assume an interior solution, such that ˆ t > 0, ˆ c > cD and ˆ e < eD,
and then show the welfare function is concave. The ﬁrst derivative was given above in
equation (26). For ease of notation, we rewrite this as:
@W
@t
´ Γ ¡ Ω + Ψ (32)
where we deﬁne Γ = (º ¡ 1)®eP¡², Ω = º®e2t²P¡²¡1 and Ψ = ¸®°e°+1²°P¡²°¡1. Dif-


















To prove that there is a unique interior solution, we seek to demonstrate that the welfare
function is globally concave. Our proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that the
welfare function is nonconcave, such that:
²eΓ ¡ (1 + ²)eΩ +
P
t






























1 ¡ ²(1 ¡ °)
²
Ψ (37)
As Ω > 0 and Ψ > 0, for reasonable values of the parameters, such as ° > 0 and ² < 1, the
right hand side of the inequality in equation (37) is negative, which implies @W=@t < 0.
But if the welfare function is strictly decreasing in t, the optimum tax rate is ˆ t = 0 which
a corner solution, contradicting our assumption of an interior solution. Hence we conclude
that for an interior solution, the welfare function is concave in t. It therefore follows that
the interior solution is unique.
18Proof of Proposition 1
We prove here that there exists a unique interior commitment solution to equation (12)
which we denote (t¤;c¤;e¤). We assume an interior solution such that t¤ > 0 and hence
c¤ > cD and e¤ < eD and then show the welfare function under commitment is concave,
mirroring the approach to the Proof of Proposition 2 above. The ﬁrst derivative under
commitment is given by equation (27) above. For convenience we rewrite this as:
dW
dt
= Γ ¡ Ω + Ψ + X1 ¡ X2 (38)
where X1 = ºt®P¡² de
dt and X2 = ¸°e°¡1®°P¡²° de
dt. Diﬀerentiating with respect to t, this











+ Θ1X1 ¡ Θ2X2 (39)










t. As above, suppose the welfare
function is nonconcave. It follows that:
²eΓ ¡ (1 + ²)eΩ +
P
t







¡ PΘ1X1 + PΘ2X2 · 0 (40)































Noting that de=dt < 0, X2 < 0 and that P > et, it follows that for reasonable values of
the parameters, including ° > 0 and ² < 1, that each component on the right hand side
of the inequality is negative. This implies that the welfare function is strictly decreasing
in t. This contradicts the assumption of an interior solution. It follows that the welfare
function is concave for an interior solution, and that the interior solution is unique.
Proof of Proposition 4
We prove that if commitment is not feasible, the commitment outcome can nevertheless
be achieved by delegation of the authority to set the carbon tax to an environmentalist













Substituting in for the respective derivatives gives:



















Hence the commitment outcome can always be achieved dy delegation to an agency with
weight ¸P on emissions, where ¸P is deﬁned by equation (44).
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